ENDING THE WAR IN CHECHNYA

Co-director of the Centre for Caucasus Studies, shares his views on the situation in Chechnya.

Also taking part in the discussion were Yuri Djibladze, Elena Topoleva, Masha Gessen and Julia Kachalova.

At a press conference on February 23rd, the heads of a number of non-profit organizations announced the start of a nationwide campaign by Russia's "third sector", calling for the withdrawal of Federal troops from Chechnya, and an end to the war there.
We were a bit nervous preparing for our meeting with the journalists, inasmuch as we were expecting to be grilled on the possible consequences of taking this or that political step. Being far removed from politics, we didn't think it proper for us to judge the pros or cons of the different ways of managing the conflict which had been put forward by the leaders of various political parties and blocs. That's something for the politicians to do. We were certain only that the war should be stopped, and that Federal troops should be withdrawn from the territory of the Chechen Republic. On the eve of the press conference, we met with the Co-director of the Centre for Caucasus Studies, the famous scholar and writer Aleksandr Iskandryan. We asked him how, in his view, the withdrawal of troops would affect the situation in both Chechnya and Russia, and what long-term consequences we can expect from the conflict itself. Our conversation with Iskandryan--who has been to Chechnya many times over the last year and a half--helped give us a view of the Chechen problem entirely different from that provided by official circles.

Opponents of a withdrawal of Federal troops from Chechnya claim that such a move would be followed by a bloodbath, with hundreds of thousands dead from the remaining ethnic Russian population, and segments of the anti-Dudayev opposition. Is this realistic?

According to official data released prior to the introduction of Federal troops into Chechnya, the whole operation was mounted because in the three years of Dudayev's rule (before October 1994), thirty thousand people there either died or disappeared without a trace. Again according to official data, one year after the outbreak of war, fifty thousand people have died in Chechnya. I submit that both these figures are a lie: the first is inflated, and the second is too low. But even if you believe this data, simple arithmetic shows that an immediate withdrawal of troops would lead, without any doubt, to a decrease in the number of casualties. Even if you suppose that some sort of "ethnic cleansing" could follow a troop withdrawal as a kind of revenge, these would be isolated events. They'd be carried out with Kalashnikovs, not Su-27s: they wouldn't be mass slaughters, or the indiscriminate bombing of whole cities.
So far as ethnic Russians are concerned, there are very few of them left in Chechnya. They're primarily old people, and 80 percent of these are women. There is one other group of ethnic Russians--these are also women, integrated into Chechen society. I don't think they'd be touched. At least, no one has touched them so far. In Chechnya, there is no ethnic hostility between Chechens and Russians. The Chechens battling Federal troops consider themselves soldiers of the Republic of Ichkeriya, fighting against the Russian Federation. People, including Russians, are dying at the hands of Federal forces. This is easy to understand in the case of Grozny. Grozny has always been a Russian city, with very few Chechen inhabitants. By calling on traditional means, it was far easier for Chechens to get out of the city than it was for Russians. By the time military operations began, the only people left in Grozny were peaceful civilians, mostly Russians, and the young Chechens who were ready to fight. There were very few losses among the fighters. Principally, people died from the bombardment. Peaceful civilians. Russians. Russians were bombarding a Russian city. The Chechens have studiously avoided the manner of fighting which the Russians have tried to foist upon them.
Regarding the Anti-Dudayev opposition, it existed only before the introduction of Federal troops into Chechnya. At rallies now, people who earlier swore opposition to the regime stand side-by-side with Dudayev supporters. Now, the war isn't being fought between Dudayev's people and Russia. It's between Ichkeriya and the Federal government. The political differences which existed in Chechnya prior to the introduction of Federal troops have been reduced to nothing by the Kremlin's actions. Before the introduction of troops onto the territory of the republic, Zavgaev had a rather high approval rating. Many people hoped that he could bring some kind of order to the region. But after his riding into town in a tank, after his non-existent "elections", after he's demonstrated to the people that everything happening in Chechnya matters to him not in the least, Zavgaev can't even get into Grozny. He's sitting in a bunker at the airport, surrounded by his own police--who fight to the death--and Federal troops. Today, the opposition numbers not more than a few hundred people.
Chechen society, which has been atomized down to the level of the village, is, perhaps not surprisingly, quite stable. Power in the villages is in the hands of the elders, and representatives of the village councils. After the introduction of Federal troops, it could hardly have developed into a full-fledged government, and remains at the village level. Thus, a complete loss of control and degeneration into some sort of bloody nightmare is extremely unlikely.

If you were president of the Russian Federation, which means would you choose of ending the Chechen conflict?

In my view, the most sensible policy would be not a sudden withdrawal of troops, but a gradual one, linked to the beginning of direct negotiations with Dudayev. The question of Chechnya's status should not be examined until peace has been restored to the republic, accompanied by parliamentary elections, presidential elections, and a referendum on independence for Chechnya. This is, for example, what the Israelis are doing right now in Palestine, a way of avoiding sudden shifts in direction.
An immediate withdrawal of troops would result in the creation of some kind of government or pre-governmental structures in Chechnya's atomized society. Remember that during the three years when there weren't Federal troops in Chechnya, no Chechen government was formed. Dudayev wasn't really President; he held power only in grozny. Labazanov was in Urus-Martan; someone else was somewhere else; and there was no one at all in the Naterech region.
Ideally, we need to stimulate the creation of a Chechen government or autonomy. We should already be holding negotiations on those problems on which we can reach an agreement: definition of borders; trade; legitimating the existing government; defining the status of Chechnya's citizens; and economic and financial problems. Discussing these problems won't ruin either the Russian side, or Dudayev's. They will lead to a peace process that can immediately and dramatically reduce the level of confrontation. As world experience shows, the negotiating process rapidly reduces the significance of people like Dudaev and Basaev.

How will Russia be affected by the fact that no foundation for a Chechen government will be laid?

It won't be affected at all. I'm talking about Chechnya, not Russia. Let's say that Russia suddenly withdraws its troops, and sets up an impenetrable border. (However, you can only take "impenetrable" with a grain of salt. Dagestan, Ossetia and Ingushetiya are all part of Russia, and in them, Chechens live everywhere. So it would be impossible to seal the border completely. But let's suppose this anyway.) Everything would be fine, in Russia. But Chechnya would remain a hotbed of permanent instability, devoid of law and order. Remember: before the introduction of Russian troops, Chechnya was in fact a haven not just for the Chechen mafia, but for criminal elements from all over Russia. This was not because Dudaev welcomed them with open arms; rather, it was due to the absence there of law enforcement agencies.
If we now withdraw our troops immediately, no one will replace them. There won't be any Chechen police force, since there is no legitimate government. There's no legitimate government because no negotiations are being held, and it's not clear just who Dudayev is or who he represents. There have been no parliamentary elections in the republic. There's no constitution. There's no president. Accordingly, there's no one who really wants to create structures capable of controlling the situation in Chechnya; a police force, for example.

Does this mean there can be no foundation for government laid in Chechnya without Russia?

It's the Chechens' job to establish a government for themselves, of course. The result of that process will be autonomy, a free association of governments, or a new member of the CIS. I would like to say only that this process can be made more smooth. It can be done without major interruptions, without risk--and without the creation of an interminable "black hole" in the Caucasus, armed to the teeth and having an illegitimate government that swings from one extreme to the other.

Just who is the government in Chechnya right now remains an open question. With whom can we conduct negotiations?

It's quite clear that Doku Zavgaev has no authority, even in his own bunker. In the usual sense of the word, Dudayev represents authority, although he's most likely just a symbol. In another sense, Maskhadov holds power. In yet another, military commanders and the above-mentioned traditional structures are the local authorities. We have to negotiate with the new government, beginning with Dudayev. There's no other way. Eventually, Dudayev will force us to hold talks with him. While the war in Chechnya was the center of attention for Russia and the world community, there were no acts of terrorism. They began only after they grew accustomed to the war and started to forget about it. The next step might be an explosion in the Moscow metro, or something of that sort. It's strange the authorities haven't yet realized that you can't get rid of terrorism through police measures.
Look again at the Israeli experience. In order to negotiate with Yasser Arafat, it was necessary to make him into something other than the representative of a terrorist organization. They did this. First, they created a "quasi"-governmental structure, the police. Then, they held elections. Arafat became head of an autonomy, and now they'll negotiate with him on the status of the autonomy, and its independence.

Only yesterday, we heard news reports about an Israeli bus being bombed. Is this a one-time only incident, or the beginning of a new wave of terrorism?

It's not just one of a kind, but Arafat didn't have anything to do with it. It was carried out by the Hamas movement; they don't take orders from Arafat, and he has absolutely no influence over them. As I already said, the normalization of political structures leads to terrorism becoming a more localized, marginal phenomenon, and losing the support of the majority of the population. A large number of Palestinians do not, of course, support the totally unrealistic demand of "all Jews should be sent back to the countries they came from", which Hamas advocates. This point of view is held only by a rather narrow grouping of terrorists. The more conditions are normalized, the narrower this grouping gets. And clearly, it's easier to deal with localized phenomena than with a situation where every kid on the street is throwing rocks at Jewish cars. I'm not saying that the process is easy; it's very difficult, and already has taken a long time. Even if the policy is carried out wisely, individual groups who continue to carry out terrorist acts will remain. But this will be only four or five people. Fifty people. Maybe five hundred. But not a million!

Can you tell us what effect the presence of Federal troops in Chechnya might have on the course of negotiations?

They won't have any effect on the course of negotiations. But they will affect the situation in the republic. A withdrawal of Russian troops should be a part of the overall negotiating process, stimulating the creation of Chechen governmental structures. A withdrawal of Russian troops should be one of the topics for negotiation. If the troops are withdrawn suddenly, then we'll have to conduct negotiations on recognizing the independence of Chechnya. If negotiations are held on the level of "Dudayev is a criminal", then they're absolutely pointless. The topic for negotiations will be the deciding factor in whether or not they'll go forward.
I'll give you another example from world experience. When the British government declared they were ready to begin negotiations, the Irish ordered a moratorium on their so-called "military operations", since they decided that they could achieve their goals through other means. The negotiations went on and on, without result. When the IRA was finally convinced that the negotiations were leading to "The Irish are a bunch of bastards; they have to give up their weapons", "military operations" were renewed. Accordingly, it's important not just to begin negotiations, but to understand why you're there, and what they're about. In a rigid system of government, where power is exercised from the top down, the fact that negotiations have begun signals the presence of some kind of aims that should be pursued in their course. Under Russia's current system, negotiations began by accident. It was also by accident that they were cut short.

We're afraid that the war in Chechnya will have a long-term effect as a "splitting of peoples". This means the geopolitical division of Russia, and the appearance of various "phobias" based on ethnicity. Do you also share these fears?

The Chechen crisis is a factor which can catalyze the growth in our country of undesirable ethnic relations. The growth of ethnophobia began immediately after the unsuccessful October putsch of 1993. The so-called "Causasophobia" and "dark-skinnedophobia" started to unfold in the mass media. It looks as though this was in fact a government campaign to try and direct people's dissatisfaction towards "others", against different ethnic groups. I don't think, however, that this was done deliberately.
Of course, there are always reasons for ethnophobia, in any country. Experience shows that if the number of ethnic minorities exceeds a certain percent, and if they're sufficiently regarded as "outsiders", this will lead to ethnophobia. Problems like this are found practically everywhere in the West: with the Turks in Germany, the Algerian Arabs in France, and the West Indian immigrants in Great Britain. In the US, ethnophobia is directed in certain areas against Blacks, and elsewhere against Latinos.
Russia differs from the above countries in that, first of all, this phenomenon is comparatively new, and our society has not yet been able to develop a resistance to it. Second, since a civil society has not yet taken shape, there are also no political blocs to fight against the ethnophobia which exists in the minds of those who hold power in developed areas.
If in the West a politician of more or less important status begins saying openly that the Turks, for example, are a criminal element, he becomes an outcast: he'll be relegated to political fringe groups which represent very narrow segments of society, and will have no real influence in mainstream politics.
If we look at Caucasians in general and Chechens in particular, the image of the "evil Chechen" who "creeps ashore and hones his knife" is no recent creation, but dates back to the time of Pushkin and Lermontov. Since the last century's Caucasus Wars, the warning "Don't dare go to sleep; the Chechen roams across the river in the dark of night!" has become ingrained in the Russian mass consciousness. The understanding of this continues to be that the Chechen roams not on the other side of the Moscow River, but across the Terek; that is, he's on his own native soil, and the Russians have come to conquer his country, since Chechnya then was still an independent country. This image of the wild savage was resurrected again in an official media campaign of 1944, during the deportations of suspected Nazi sympathizers to Siberia. Material appeared in the press claiming that certain Caucasus nations supported Hitler, and presented him with a white stallion, and lists of armed detachments that supposedly backed Hitler were published. During the years of "developing Socialism", under all the noisy fanfare about "friendship of peoples", the fanning of ethnophobia ceased. In our time, with the help of the authorities (who really don't understand what they're doing), this particular genie has once again been let out of the bottle.
Today, the significance of the so-called "Chechen mafia" has been greatly exaggerated, although Chechen, gangs are far from being the largest in Moscow. The largest criminal organizations are multi-ethnic; principally, they're Russian. This doesn't mean that Russians are any more criminal than anyone else. It's just that Moscow is a Russian city. Of course, ethnic crime does exist. In such gangs, non-Russians make up the backbone of the organization. I've been told by specialists that among these, Lithuanians have become quite powerful (something that no one ever mentions), along with Ukrainian and Georgian gangs. There are also Chechens, of course, but they're in no way the most powerful, inasmuch as there are very few chechens in Moscow. I saw a completely ludicrous report in the Russian press that said the "Chechen mafia" controls crime in Germany, Great Britain, the United States and so on.
I'm not inclined to think that the Russian politicians calling for Moscow to be "cleansed" of Caucasians are really chauvinists and ethnophobes. They simply have to justify their actions and try to remain popular. Unfortunately, the state of society is such that their approval ratings will shoot up if they say "Every Chechen is either a murderer or a bandit". There are no organized blocs of such politicians. They'd probably be popular with the Germans who say "All Turks are bastards". But the function of the State on the one hand, and the intelligentsia on the other, is to fight against such people.
I'm somewhat acquainted with the German and American governments' programs for fighting ethnophobia. They include special television shows and educational programs, explaining that Turks aren't necessarily crooks and savages, and not necessarily even garbagemen. They say that Turkey is a country with a culture different from Germany's, and so on. It's hard to make such programs--they require a lot of money--but in countries where people understand that it's much easier to whip up ethnophobia than to combat it, they spend the money.
And of course, fighting ethnophobia is a function of the intelligentsia. Unfortunately, if one looks at Moscow empirically, a significant portion of the intelligentsia doesn't combat Caucasophobia; at least, they don't pay any attention to it. Second, "Easterners" represent a completely different culture.
The problem is quite real, especially if one takes into account that the Russian mentality has been distorted by seventy years of Soviet rule. The Soviet babushka is used to the idea that only the State can carry out trade. She's used to hearing people being called "speculators", and to this day refers to those who don't work in a factory or on a collective farm as "non-productive elements". This babushka thinks that only those who grow fruit and vegetables should be able to sell them at the market. But even this is bad, since trading is bad in general. And then our babushka sees that Azerbaijanis trade. And not in potatoes, either, but in bananas and kiwi fruit that they obviously didn't grow themselves. This means that the Azerbaijanis are middlemen and speculators. The babushka can't buy bananas or kiwis because they're too expensive. The many years of Soviet power convinced her that she should be able to buy anything that's displayed on the counter. It's hard for her to understand that she can't buy them, but that somebody else might be able to. Moreover, these "speculators" look different, behave differently, and talk among themselves in a different language. There's a whole lot of them! And our babushka starts hating them.
Someone has to explain to her that these people have to travel around the world in search of work, since the standard of living in their countries is extremely low, industry has come to a standstill, and it's difficult to find work. She has to be shown these television programs, and have it pointed out that Muslim Magomaev, the famous Neapolitan-style singer, is just as much an Azerbaijani as those sellers standing in the markets.
It's the job of society, the government and the intelligentsia to fight ethnophobia. Unfortunately, they haven't realized that yet here. Even the most liberal elements of society don't find it embarrassing to say "We have to protect the Russian-speaking minority in Chechnya". Or, that they're "killing our boys there". Apparently, the boys who are dying on the other side aren't ours.
Ethnophobia is on the rise, and it won't stop with the Chechens. It's already expanding to cover all Causasians, and to a certain degree Central Asians, Ukrainians, and so on. This is very dangerous. We have to put the genie back into the bottle. True, I'm afraid that we'll first have to establish Russian civil society.

EPILOGUE

We too also believe that the first shoots of civil society have already broken through the harsh soil of Russian reality. We include here the third sector's campaign to end the war in Chechnya, which was first unveiled by various Russian non-profit organizations. From the first day of the war, human rights groups, women's groups, ecology and other organizations have carried out a number of protests. Today, they have decided to present a united front. At present, signatures are being collected in support of non-profit organizations' petition for an end to the war. The plan is to forward the petition to the President and government. If this proves ineffective, we will have to resort to other methods of protest.
We propose that all Russian non-profit organizations come together for this purpose. For this, we need the following information:
the name of the organization;
its city;
whether or not it will sign the petition;
the date;
the name of the head of the organization;
the name of the contact person;
and the organization's telephone, fax and e-mail numbers.
Every organization has its own contacts, address lists and data bases. Tell everyone you can of the petition and its text. If the organization for one reason or another cannot, or does not want to sign the petition, individuals, workers and volunteers can add their signatures to it. In this case, you must indicate your relation to the organization along with your name. Private citizens who don't belong to a non-profit organization cannot participate in this protest.

Information on joining in the petition can be sent via e-mail: asi@glas.apc.org, nan@glas.apc.org; telephone numbers (095) 249-39-89 (ASI), (095) 126-34-75, (095) 126-88-61 (the NAN Foundation); and by fax: (095) 310-70-76 (the NAN Foundation).

PETITION

from Russian Non-profit Organizations to The President of the Russian Federation, Members of the Government of the RF, and Deputies of the RF Federation Council

Dear Mr. President, Dear Members of the Government, Dear Deputies of the State Duma and Federation Council:

Russian private, non-profit organizations are petitioning you for an immediate end to the war in Chechnya. In Russia today, these organizations already number more than 40 thousand, and they bind together more than a million members and volunteer workers. All of us--human rights workers, ecologists, employees of charitable foundations, women and youth movements, associations of leading figures in science, culture, education and other social groups--are working in these organizations because we both wish and believe it possible that we, united with those who share our views, can change life for the better, and help those in need of help. This is the very foundation of democracy, and of the civil society for which we are all striving. We cannot simply stand by and watch what is happening in Russia; we cannot remain aloof from the war in Chechnya, which has already lasted for more than a year.

This war will not only result in thousands of deaths on the battlefield, but will divide the multi-ethnic peoples of Russia for years to come; it will doom the people to decades of living in fear of terrorism, new bloodshed, and the continuation of an endless cycle of revenge and desperation. We consider the war in Chechnya a disgrace for our country, barbaric, and a great disaster for our people. There is nothing more important for Russian society than ending the war in Chechnya. We cannot hold elections, or introduce new laws, economic policies or social programs while the main question remains unresolved: an end to the war. We demand the immediate withdrawal of Federal troops from Chechnya, and an end to the bloodletting. We demand that you stop the war!


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